China has got lucky with Trump. Can the rest of the world?

America’s stated ambition has been to sign 90 trade deals in 90 days. The clock started ticking on April 9th, when reciprocal tariffs on roughly as many countries were paused, and will continue until a deadline on July 8th. Over a third of the way through the period, only two deals have been announced. One with Britain, an ally with which America has been in talks for a decade. The other with China, a rival with which President Donald Trump had ignited a fierce trade war. Tariffs came down in both instances; neither country granted America big concessions.

The remaining 88 countries have employed plenty of diplomatic charm in seeking to advance their case, but have made slow and uneven progress. No negotiating team has stayed at the front of the queue for long. Squabbling over a deal’s fine print leads to a swift demotion. As the clock ticks down, the stakes rise. Nobody wants to be out in the cold on July 8th.

Since mid-April, the Trump administration has prioritised 20 or so economies. These include big trading partners that would be heavily penalised by the deferred reciprocal tariffs, such as the European Union, Japan and Vietnam, as well as a few minnows, such as Fiji. A smattering of leaders with whom Mr Trump gets on, such as Argentina’s Javier Milei, also made the list. The larger the trading partner, the more American consumers would feel painful price rises in the absence of a deal. American policymakers believe that negotiations with Britain and Fiji are a useful signal of their desires to countries that are further back in the queue, and one which should accelerate other negotiations.

Given the tumultuous nature of talks so far, such rationalisations are not entirely convincing. All the discussions are vulnerable to presidential whims. At first, America’s priority was big East Asian exporters, including Japan and Vietnam. But after Ishiba Shigeru, Japan’s prime minister, said that America’s insistence on excluding sectoral tariffs from negotiations was unfair, India stole his country’s position—only to then lose ground because of the slow pace of its own negotiations. Having lost priority status, Indian officials duly filed a motion with the World Trade Organisation, seeking to toughen their export controls on America. After Mr Trump’s negotiators received a warm welcome from Switzerland over the weekend, the president said that it would be bumped up the line. Only the EU has maintained a consistent position throughout: at the back of the queue. Mr Trump has called the bloc “nastier than China" as a negotiating partner. More diplomatically, Mr Bessent notes that talks are tough because, “The Italians want something that is different from the French."

Three themes stand out so far. The first, and most important, is that no country manages to hold America’s attention for long. In normal times, trade deals are negotiated bilaterally. Even defining broad terms, which is what Mr Trump is mostly attempting at present, tends to take years. American negotiators seem to believe that their current speed-run approach offers leverage. If they reach a stumbling-point with one country, well, no problem—they can simply move on to the next. Witness the fate of Japan when it urged America to remove its tariff of 25% on car imports.

The difficulty is that as different countries make it to the front, the hopes of their negotiators rise. Perhaps it will be they who charm the Trump administration into a uniquely good deal. For example, India also attempted to persuade America to remove car and steel tariffs as part of a “zero for zero" deal. Yet only Britain has earned any such carve-out, and even then for just 100,000 cars a year. As such attempts fail, churn is the result. “It feels like the window of opportunity each time is very small," says a Vietnamese official.

Beijing barrier

Next is the China factor. Third countries have two superpowers to keep happy. On May 14th Chinese officials attacked Britain’s deal with America, alleging that it indirectly targets China. Under the terms of the agreement, Britain escapes tariffs on steel exports, but only if America gets a say over who owns its plants. Other “national security" measures in the deal also upset China. Such complaints will arise again. Japan feared that America’s demands on strategic goods would irritate China. America’s negotiators raise the question of “What are you doing and what could you do vis-à-vis China?" in every negotiation, according to one official.

The third theme concerns unforeseen sticking-points. Countries that exchange hundreds of thousands of goods each year often have specific gripes. British officials complained to their American counterparts about the quality of Uncle Sam’s beef. American officials have demanded that Japanese politicians liberalise their rice market, a political taboo, and made unsubstantiated allegations of currency manipulation against Thailand. Sometimes disputes have little to do with commerce. On May 1st Thailand dropped charges against Paul Chambers, an American academic imprisoned for lèse-majesté (insulting royalty) in a move Thai officials insisted was unrelated to trade talks. Diplomatic dances over such issues would usually take years. Mr Trump has less time, meaning they can derail negotiations.

America is not going to meet its original ambition of signing 90 trade agreements by July 8th. More deals will nevertheless have been signed by that time. And negotiations with many countries will continue beyond the deadline, with their officials hoping for an extension of the present tariff pause to tide them over.

At the same time, Mr Trump will need to show his threats are credible, so as to garner concessions, predicts Josh Lipsky of the Atlantic Council, a think-tank: “There will be a few examples made." For most countries, the goal should not be to make it to the front of the queue. It should be to avoid falling to the back.