Israel’s limited missile strike on Iran may be the start of a wider assault
Summary
- Whatever Iran’s response to the attack, it carries risks for the regime
AFTER DECADES of shadow war between the Jewish State and the Islamic Republic, in the early hours of October 26th Israel carried out its first officially acknowledged attack on Iran. Dozens of warplanes flying at least 1,300km from their bases in Israel launched missiles against air-defence facilities and missile factories in three Iranian provinces, including on the outskirts of the capital, Tehran.
It is a measure of the sky-high levels of tension in the Middle East that the targets chosen by Israel, which were purely military, were perceived to be among the more limited of its options. Since Iran launched 181 ballistic missiles against Israel on October 1st, officials close to Binyamin Netanyahu had been talking up the Israeli prime minister’s view that a “historic opportunity" had opened up for landing a strategic blow on Iran.
Instead Israel mainly hit Iran’s Russian-made S-300 air-defence radars and missile launchers, avoiding its nuclear sites. Nor did the Israelis destroy vital economic targets such as oil-export terminals. This suggests that Israel is, for once, taking into consideration the pressure from its American ally. It may also suggest Israel is preparing the ground for a subsequent, much more devastating, strike.
The key to understanding Israel’s decision is the American political calendar. With America’s presidential election just ten days away, Israel had the choice of retaliating against military targets, with America’s tacit blessing, or defying President Joe Biden’s explicit warnings not to attack nuclear or energy-related facilities on the eve of the vote. The latter would have jeopardised future co-operation with a Democratic administration, should Kamala Harris win on November 5th. In the event of victory for Donald Trump, who has already expressed his support for an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear programme, then there is always an opportunity for future strikes.
How effective were the Israeli strikes? So far there is too little evidence to be sure. Israeli officers claim they destroyed most of Iran’s advanced air-defence capabilities and that, as a result, their air-force can operate freely in Iranian airspace. If true, it means a future Israeli strike could be much more extensive.
According to Israeli security sources, most of the targets this time were hit by air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBM) fired from aircraft well out of the range of Iran’s defences. Israel’s stock of ALBMs is limited and a more intensive air-strike campaign against Iran would call for a large number of jets using munitions at a shorter range. If Israel’s claims about this strike are true, this is now possible. It will take many months for Iran to rebuild its air-defences, especially when its Russian suppliers need their own batteries for their war with Ukraine.
Iran still has large numbers of missiles and drones and could carry out a third strike on Israel. But it is unlikely to rush into such a move. Not only would this run the risk of provoking a much more damaging Israeli counter-strike, but Iran’s leaders are also watching America’s election carefully. The overriding concern for Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is the stability of his regime. Either course of action–attacking Israel again or holding fire–carries risks. For the first time since the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, the residents of Tehran have seen their city under military attack. Not responding would be perceived as a sign of weakness.
But retaliating could invite devastating consequences. Israel may have taken out one of Iran’s most important defences in this strike: the S-300 batteries. It has already diminished significantly the protection offered by the missile arsenal Iran supplied to Hizbullah, the Shia militia in Lebanon, as a threat against Israel. Most of the Iranian precision-guided missiles have been destroyed in recent Israeli air-strikes on Lebanon.
For now at least, Iran is seeking to downplay the Israeli strike; its semi-official news agency, Tasnim, labelled Israel’s claims as “complete lies" and said that only “limited damage" was caused. Tehran will almost certainly bide its time before deciding if and how to respond.
There are domestic implications for Mr Netanyahu as well. After boosting expectations, his political rivals are already blaming him for missing an opportunity. Before the strike Naftali Bennett, a former prime minister and future right-wing challenger, urged the government “to destroy Iran’s nuclear programme". Yair Lapid, the centrist leader of the opposition, said “the decision not to attack strategic and economic targets was mistaken."
This time Mr Netanyahu has chosen to exercise strategic patience, at least for now. But if he is prepared to pay a political price for choosing a more measured course of action against Iran, it almost certainly means that on the other fronts Israel is waging war–Gaza and Lebanon–he will be less receptive to pressure for ceasefires. Add to that the pressure from his far-right allies, who have the power to topple his government during the next session of the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, which begins on October 27th, and any kind of cessation of Israel’s other wars looks less likely.
The nature of this strike on Iran appears to show that when America cares to apply serious pressure, it can still shape Israeli policy. Israel has repeatedly escalated the fighting in Gaza and Lebanon this year, in defiance of the Biden administration’s urgings. This time it acted in full co-ordination, so far avoiding a move that could have caused both regional conflagration and a global energy price spike. However the risk is that this attack was only a prelude to a more serious assault to follow.
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