The West is rethinking how to fight wars
Ukraine’s daring raid on Russia has lessons for European armed forces. But they need cash, too
THE UKRAINIAN drones that emerged from lorries deep inside Russia on June 1st, then plunged onto Russian air fields and struck perhaps a dozen bombers will be ranked among the great raiding parties of military history. The operation combined old-fashioned sabotage with the iconic weapon of the war in Ukraine. In doing this it illustrated two things. One is that new technology, deployed inventively, can be disproportionately lethal. The other is that the battlefield now stretches deep behind the front line, overturning the assumptions of the past quarter century.
Britain’s defence review, published the next day, deserves praise for recognising both these lessons. It also serves as a worked example of the new, more flexible thinking that will be needed in Europe and Asia to deal with the breakneck innovations that are transforming warfare. However, the review also points to the hardest problem in turning such thinking into reality—finding the money to pay for it.
After decades of complacency, Britain, like its allies, has acknowledged that it must prepare for war. That means building up the ammunition, forces and technologies for fighting abroad, as well as securing the home front. After the cold war, the Royal Air Force (RAF), like many of its European counterparts, saved money by shutting down bases and consolidating aircraft at ever fewer places. Ukraine’s surprise attack is a reminder of why that now looks like a mistake. The review says that the RAF must relearn how to fight from a wider range of sites, and to disperse its munitions, spare parts and fuel.
The same principle of resilience applies more widely: redundancy applies as much to undersea cables, electrical substations and communications as it does to air bases. The British review rightly calls for a “whole of society" approach in which industry, finance, academia, education and ordinary people are better prepared for crises.
The way of thinking about military technology needs to be similarly supple. “Emerging technologies", the review warns, “are already changing the character of warfare more profoundly than at any point in human history." Britain and its allies have been slow to adapt. The review laments that, for defence projects worth more than £20m, awarding a contract takes an average of 6.5 years. It recommends that 10% of the annual defence procurement budget should be earmarked for novel technologies.
Bolder, faster reorganisation of military services is part of the prescription, too. The Royal Navy will accelerate the creation of a “hybrid" carrier air wing, with both sophisticated and simple drones flying alongside F-35s. The army will have a 20-40-40 mix of equipment. Crewed platforms will make up only 20% of kit. They will control uncrewed platforms that can be reused (40%) as well as “consumables" like shells, missiles and single-use strike drones (40%).
Britain has a good opportunity to experiment in this way because big land powers such as Germany are expanding their traditional ground forces. Wisely, however, the review resists the temptation to declare that old, large equipment is obsolete. Not every act of war can be waged with drones in trucks. The review concludes that tanks still matter, for instance, not least because they protect troops on an increasingly transparent battlefield. The commitment to build up to a dozen attack submarines is a reminder that one of the largest and costliest weapons, the nuclear-powered submarine, remains one of the most potent.
So far, so laudable. But there remains a glaring gap between ambition and money. Britain plans to spend 2.5% of GDP on defence by 2027, with a vague ambition of 3% by 2034. That is grossly inadequate. Russia is rearming quickly and America is signalling that it will shift forces away from Europe. Germany, faced by the same threats, could be spending twice as much as Britain by 2029.
NATO allies are likely to agree to a target of 3.5% of GDP on defence at a summit on June 24th. That would require painful tax rises, welfare cuts or borrowing. But it is hard to see how Europe can support Ukraine, deter Russia and fill gaps left by America on much less.
In 2014 NATO allies agreed to a 2% target—and ignored it. This time around, the timeline is as important as the target. There is little point in deferring spending to the 2030s. “Until recently…a war against another country with advanced military forces was unthinkable," says the British defence review, warning that conflict would be deadly and long-lasting. How much better to deter such a war than wage it.
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