Nitin Pai: How to dissuade Pakistan from deploying terrorism

Some have argued that the terrorist attack in Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir marked a failure of deterrence. Others claim that Operation Sindoor restored that deterrence. Yet others claim that Sindoor itself is a failure because it will not prevent Pakistan from instigating terrorist attacks in the future. Much of the confusion comes from the lazy—and inappropriate—use of the term ‘deterrence’ in the context of terrorism and its punishment.

Also Read: Nitin Pai: Operation Sindoor leaves India better placed for the next round

Deterrence is a situation in which an adversary is persuaded not to take a particular action by holding out a threat of punishment. In the context of India and Pakistan, we can say that there is mutual nuclear deterrence because each side knows that it would suffer unacceptably severe damage.

So, neither side will use nuclear weapons unless its red lines are crossed. These deliberately set the bar very high: India will not use nuclear weapons unless it is first attacked with them; Pakistan will use them only if its existence is threatened.

Now here’s the point: the existence of nuclear deterrence does not mean other types of conflicts are also deterred. Since the mid-1980s, Pakistan believed —and convinced many foreign strategists—that it could use its nuclear weapons to deter a conventional military attack. This emboldened its leaders to pursue a proxy war first in Punjab and later in Jammu and Kashmir with impunity. The calculation was that nuclear weapons not only neutralized India’s stronger conventional forces, but also afforded Pakistan space to promote terrorism and insurgency.

Also Read: World should take note of Pak’s nuclear bombs

The post-Uri surgical strikes, the Balakot operation and now Operation Sindoor have shown that Pakistan can no longer assume that it can deter India at the conventional level. Operation Sindoor, particularly, demonstrated New Delhi’s willingness and capacity to hit Pakistani targets along the entire length of the border.

Contrary to subsequent media hype, the targets were chosen to keep the nuclear angle out of the picture. The message was clear: nuclear weapons will not deter India from engaging in conventional warfare with a punitive intensity.

India, for its part, had never been able to deter Pakistan from using terrorism. The bad news is that despite the military response, it will remain nearly impossible to do so in the future. As I have argued in recent columns, India has over the past three decades raised Pakistan’s costs, leading to a reduction in the frequency and intensity of terror attacks.

Also Read: Nitin Pai: Operation Sindoor sets a new normal for India’s strategy

Operation Sindoor has managed to ratchet up those costs significantly. It is possible to raise them further, but, unfortunately, never to a level that is prohibitive to the other side. So, it is a matter of time before another Pakistani general is tempted to take another—albeit more expensive—shot at the country’s old game. Operation Sindoor is, thus, about dissuasion, discouragement and disincentivization.

Contrary to intuition, the fact that India is prepared to suffer damage in order to punish Pakistan makes this strategy all the more credible.

The Pahalgam attacks are a reminder that the task of dissuasion is continuous and multipronged. It starts with policies that reduce the impact of terrorism. 

It is obvious that the Pakistani establishment uses terror attacks not only to trigger a disproportionate security response that alienates the local population in Kashmir, but also to spark communal tensions across the country. To the extent that Indian society is united, harmonious and at peace with itself, even a big terror attack will only have a small political impact.

Second, India should continue to systematically engage Pakistan’s key foreign partners and persuade them that terrorism being fuelled by Pakistan is not in their interests. Over the past three decades, Indian diplomacy has been successful in getting the United States, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates to stop rewarding Rawapindi’s capers. There should be no let up on this front and it is a job for India’s professional diplomats.

Third, intelligence capabilities and the security architecture need constant attention. This is all the more challenging because the restoration of democratic politics and normal life in Jammu and Kashmir requires a relaxation of security arrangements. It is not surprising that the Pahalgam attack took place in a period of transition.

Finally, the military balance must overwhelmingly be in India’s favour across the Line of Control as well as the border. This is a corollary of the post-Sindoor normal. It is not just a comparison of troop numbers and arsenals, but a matter of the size of the qualitative edge. There are indications that China’s support for Pakistani military operations went beyond supplying equipment. This ought to change our calculations of the military balance required to dissuade Rawalpindi’s generals.

The author is co-founder and director of The Takshashila Institution, an independent centre for research and education in public policy.