Opinion
Here are basic principles for an effective national security set-up in India
Summary
- In an age where the complexity of the national security ecosystem has grown by orders of magnitude compared to 2008, the national security advisor’s role needs clarity, but it’s crucial that the NSA appointee has the prime minister’s confidence.
Writing in the Indian Express last Monday, Sanjaya Baru, former media advisor to prime minister Manmohan Singh, drew attention to the appointment of a new additional national security advisor and the restructuring of the reporting relationships among top officials and institutions responsible for national security management.
Baru writes that “the absence of any clearly laid out criteria and qualifications for the post and, worse, clearly specified duties and chain of command, has left the question open as to who should be made NSA—a diplomat, a spook, a soldier or a scholar?"
Let me carry the conversation forward from the scholarly perspective of a non-partisan outsider. I am not concerned with which individual is appointed to which office or which service gains an advantage. Similarly, I do not want to make off-hand recommendations on how the national security setup can be restructured.
Rather, I want to restate the principles that will make the national security advisor (NSA), National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS) and Indian defence and intelligence organizations more effective.
The most important principle is that the NSA must enjoy the confidence and trust of the prime minister. This means that the prime minister should be unconstrained in making the choice. Given the importance of the NSA’s role, prime ministers have a natural incentive in ensuring that the job goes to a highly competent person.
Let me go further and make a point that some may find uncomfortable: if the prime minister feels that the ideological and political inclinations of the NSA are relevant, then that is the leader’s prerogative. The NSA is accountable to Parliament and the public through the prime minister.
Second, the NSA should remain an advisor and not have operational or command responsibilities. Operations should be carried out by intelligence or security forces through their respective chains of command.
This will ensure that operations are carried out by organizations that have the mandate, resources and expertise to do so, while shielding the political leadership for legitimate reasons. The NSA is not an operational shortcut and should not be treated as one.
Third, the rank assigned to the office of the NSA need not be fixed. Its current occupant has been given a cabinet rank, but previous NSAs have been of minister-of-state and principal secretary ranks. These differences have caused perplexity in the top ranks of government officials, but they have adapted.
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Arvind Gupta, a former deputy NSA, writes in his book that “at the best of times, the NSA and other functionaries work together on key issues of national security." And, “On other occasions, he works independently. The NSA can very much define his role."
Whatever the rank, the NSA’s power derives from his relationship with the prime minister. So does his effectiveness. Establishment insiders might have a different view on this, but I think the prime minister should have the flexibility of assigning the rank he deems appropriate.
Fourth, it is best that the office of the NSA remains outside the turf of any and all branches of the civil service. It is perhaps the only such position at the top level of government that is not captured by a service. We have had former Indian Administrative Service (IAS), Indian Foreign Service (IFS) and Indian Police Service (IPS) officers becoming NSAs, and this openness must remain in place.
Indeed, it should be possible for capable individuals from outside the government to be appointed to the role. Of course, it will be extremely hard for an outsider to operate effectively in what is the most secretive part of the establishment. Sometimes, though, an outsider is just what secretive establishments need.
Fifth, it is the NSA who should do the prime minister’s daily security briefings. The appointment of another security advisor (internal or additional) should not change the accountability equation. At the same time, the additional NSA, chief of defence staff (CDS), the three service chiefs, future theatre commanders and the intelligence chiefs should have direct access to the prime minister when needed.
These arrangements make the principal secretary to the prime minister a crucial player in ensuring that the national security system functions smoothly.
Finally, as Baru points out, the duties of various officials and institutions and chains of command have to be clearly specified. Any security system faces its real test during a crisis, when informal work arrangements and formal lines of responsibility play an important role. Controversies around India’s official response during the Kargil war, IC-814 hijacking and the 26/11 Mumbai attacks demonstrate this point.
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Now, with the growing relevance of cybersecurity, the institution of the CDS system and the prospective creation of theatre commands, the complexity of the national security ecosystem has grown by orders of magnitude compared to 2008, when the terrorist attack of 26/11 took place. It underlines the need for clarity of thought and purpose.
