Nitin Pai: Operation Sindoor sets a new normal for India’s strategy

Where do we go from here? The ball is in Pakistan’s court. After the first night, many expected Islamabad to use its unverified claims to declare victory and refrain from further escalation. Now it is not clear.

Also Read: Operation Sindoor: The IAF has struck terror camps in Pakistan

In any event, the strategic significance of Operation Sindoor is that it establishes a new normal: that India will respond to Pakistani-sponsored terrorism with military force. Uri, Balakot and Sindoor are the three dots that confirm this straight line. This is a watershed development, for it undermines the decades-old Pakistani strategy of using its nuclear weapons as a cover to undertake a proxy war of terrorism against India.

The fear that any military retaliation would result in a rapid escalation to nuclear war dissuaded Indian leaders—under pressure from Western capitals—from authorizing ‘hot pursuit’ and punitive strikes across the boundary. It was for this reason that Indian forces were ordered not to cross the Line of Control during the Kargil War.

After Sindoor, that impunity is gone. Striking Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba strongholds in Bahawalpur and Muridke, respectively, warns such groups that their old havens are no longer safe.

This does not mean, as some analysts claim, that “deterrence has been re-established." There was none to start with.

Deterrence is practically impossible because it would require promising a prohibitively high punishment, which is limited by the nuclear overhang. So, the Pakistani military-jihadist complex will not abandon terrorism as an instrument of politics.

Also Read: Pakistan must step back from the brink of worse

Rather, Operation Sindoor has raised the military, political and economic costs for the Pakistani establishment to a level that should severely discourage it from using terrorism for some period of time. Pakistanis might put on a brave face now, but this episode makes Pakistan’s multiple domestic crises more difficult to solve, not least because few foreign countries would want to associate with it.

As for India, as I wrote in my previous column, preventing “cross-border terrorism is therefore a multi-dimensional, perennial, round-the-clock activity that India must doggedly persist in over the long term."

New Delhi did not reveal details of its evidence to prove that the Pahalgam terrorists had Pakistani origins. This departure from the absurd hope that any proof would convince the Pakistani authorities of their own complicity in terrorism also sets a new norm. Only a cursory attempt was made to persuade the international community.

This approach is indicative both of India’s greater power in world politics as well as the erosion of the rules-based global order of the decades since the end of World War II.

The new normal also commits New Delhi to the use of military force in response to a terror attack that is at least as serious as the one in Pahalgam. This can be both a good and bad thing. The military and bureaucratic establishment in New Delhi will not have to guess whether the political leadership might authorize the use of force. Such decisions will be politically easier in the future.

On the flip side, it will be politically harder not to use the military option if the situation so demands. After the 26/11 attacks on Mumbai, for instance, I argued that India should not play into Rawalpindi’s hands by launching military strikes. Pakistan was at that time forced to deploy its troops along its western border, where it was getting hammered by Pashtun militants. A war with India would have given the Pakistani army a pretext to get out of that jam. There are times when it is wiser not to hit back and India’s leadership should be free to exercise the best option.

Military preparedness, both in India and Pakistan, will change to reflect the new normal. As they review their actions in Operation Sindoor, India’s armed forces will seek to improve effectiveness, efficiency and turnaround times for punitive cross-border operations based on the lessons learnt.

Also Read: Nitin Pai: India must stay the course in its old contest with Pakistan

Pakistan will do likewise, and in the process, deepen its dependence on Chinese and perhaps Turkish technology. This, in turn, will become a factor in New Delhi’s relations with Beijing and Ankara.

Indeed, Turkey’s signalling during this conflict is an intrusion of an outside player into subcontinental politics, which New Delhi will have to manage both by engaging Ankara as well as deepening ties with Turkish rivals Armenia, Greece and Russia.

Let me conclude by drawing attention to the big picture: India is prevailing in the long conflict with Pakistan because of our focus on growth, development, democracy and, when required, the astute use of military force. We should stay the course.

The author is co-founder and director of The Takshashila Institution, an independent centre for research and education in public policy